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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants, Alden Jenkins, Gwendolyn Neal, and Harlan 
Roberts, appeal from a judgment entered in favor of 
appellees, the Red Clay Consolidated School District Board 
of Education ("The Board") in Delaware and the individual 
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Board members,1 finding that the at-large system of electing 
Board members does not violate Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act. The district court's conclusion that appellants 
failed to establish a section 2 violation was not clearly 
erroneous, and its legal conclusions were sound. Therefore, 
we will affirm. 
 
I. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4), and 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(f). We 
have jurisdiction over this timely filed appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
Section 2 cases present mixed questions of law and fact, 
so our review of the district court's legal analysis is plenary, 
but our review of the court's factual findings is governed by 
the clearly erroneous standard. Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1116-17 (3d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1252, 114 S.Ct. 2779 (1994) 
("Jenkins II"). "[I]t is this combination of factual deference 
and legal review that best `preserves the benefit of the trial 
court's particular familiarity with the indigenous political 
reality without endangering the rule of law.' " Id. at 1117 
(citation omitted); see also Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia 
Office of City Com'rs Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 308-09 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
 
If there is some evidence to support a district court's 
findings, a reviewing court can conclude that thefindings 
are clearly erroneous only when " `the reviewing court on 
the entire evidence is left with the definite andfirm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " Anderson 
v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 
1504, 1511 (1985) (citation omitted). A reviewing court, 
however, may not substitute its own view of the weight of 
the evidence for that of the district court if the district 
court's findings represent a plausible reading of the 
evidence. Id. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. at 1511. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The individual named appellees are William E. Manning, Carolece 
Scotton, Irwin J. Becnel, Jr., Charles M. Cavanaugh, Loretta C. Rice, 
Edward M. Sosnowski, and Jacqueline Witt. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The appellants filed this case as a class action on behalf 
of all eligible black voters in the Red Clay School District to 
challenge the method of electing members to the Red Clay 
Board of Education. Appellants charged that the at-large 
electoral system "unlawfully dilutes the voting strength of 
black citizens and has the effect of providing black citizens 
in the Red Clay School District less opportunity than white 
citizens to participate in the political process and to elect 
candidates of their choice to the Red Clay Board of 
Education." Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 780 F. Supp. 221, 221-22 (D. Del. 1991) ("Jenkins 
I"), rev'd, Jenkins II, 4 F.3d 1103. 
 
The Red Clay School District was established in 
November 1980. The Board has seven seats; each member 
sits for a five-year term, and elections are staggered so that 
each year there are elections for one or two seats. The first 
election was held in January 1981; since then, elections 
have been held annually in May. Candidates for the Board 
only must obtain the signatures of 20 voters to run for the 
Board. 
 
The Red Clay electoral system is characterized as an at- 
large or multi-member district system. Jenkins I, 780 F. 
Supp. at 222. "In Red Clay, there is an assigned-post 
system, and only candidates living in a particular district 
may run for that particular district's seat. All Red Clay 
voters, however, can vote for each seat." Jenkins v. Red 
Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 1996 WL 172327, at *21 
(D. Del. 1996) ("Jenkins III"). Each voter may vote for one 
candidate from each particular district, which is called a 
nominating district, and the candidate in each nominating 
district receiving a plurality of the votes wins. Jenkins I, 
780 F. Supp. at 222. Thus, the system, though providing 
for representation on the Board from each of seven defined 
nominating districts, does so on the basis of at-large voting. 
This voting plan is at the heart of this controversy. 
 
The Supreme Court has "long recognized that. . . at-large 
voting schemes may `operate to minimize or cancel out the 
voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting 
population.' " Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-48, 106 
 
                                4 
S.Ct. 2752, 2764-65 (1986) (citations, footnote, and internal 
quotation marks omitted). The danger inherent in at-large 
voting systems is that the majority, based on its greater 
numbers, will be able to elect its chosen candidates and 
defeat the candidates preferred by the minority. Id. at 48, 
106 S.Ct. at 2765. Gingles has become a guiding case 
under the Voting Rights Act. 
 
Following a bench trial, the district court concluded that 
appellants failed to establish one of three necessary factors 
to support their case under Gingles, namely, legally 
significant white bloc voting. Nonetheless, to make a 
comprehensive record, the court also analyzed the at-large 
electoral system under the totality of the circumstances. 
Jenkins I, 780 F. Supp. at 233. The court concluded that 
even if the appellants had established the three threshold 
factors, including white bloc voting, necessary to obtain 
relief under Gingles, under the totality of the circumstances 
they failed to prove a violation of Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act. Id. at 241. 
 
Appellants appealed the district court's decision to this 
court, and we reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. Jenkins II, 4 F.3d 1103. We held that the 
district court erred in its assessment of the effects of white 
bloc voting. Only one candidate ever won a Red Clay 
Education Board election with a plurality of the vote; we 
found this single election insufficient to support the district 
court's finding that the plurality-win rule enables minority- 
preferred candidates to overcome white bloc voting. Id. at 
1122-23. We explained that the district court improperly 
based its assessment on the potential, rather than the 
actual, effects of plurality voting on the ability of black 
voters to elect their chosen representatives. Id. at 1123. 
Because we had "no way of knowing what conclusions the 
district court would have arrived at in regards to white bloc 
voting had it not been laboring under its misperception as 
to the significance of Red Clay's plurality voting scheme," 
we remanded the case to the district court for 
reconsideration. Id. 
 
On remand, the district court admitted additional 
evidence and ultimately concluded that although the 
appellants had demonstrated the presence of the three 
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threshold Gingles factors, they had not established under 
the totality of the circumstances that there had been a 
section 2 violation. Jenkins III, 1996 WL 172327. The 




Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides: 
 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or 
applied by any State or political subdivision in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color, or in contravention of the 
guarantees set forth in section 1973(b)(f)(2) of this title. 
. . . 
 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is 
established if, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes 
leading to nomination or election in the State or 
political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens 
protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in the political process and 
to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to 
which members of a protected class have been elected 
to office in the State or political subdivision is one 
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That 
nothing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal 
to their proportion in the population. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1973. "The essence of a § 2 claim is that a 
certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with 
social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in 
the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect 
their preferred representatives." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 
106 S.Ct. at 2764. In the legislative history to the 1982 
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the Senate 
enumerated several factors ("the Senate Report factors") 
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that might be relevant to an evaluation of challenges made 
under section 2: 
 
To establish a violation, plaintiffs could show a variety 
of factors, depending upon the kind of rule, practice, or 
procedure called into question. Typical factors include: 
 
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination 
in the state or political subdivision that touched the 
right of the members of the minority group to register, 
to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic 
process; 
 
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the 
state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 
 
3. the extent to which the state or political 
subdivision has used unusually large election districts, 
majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, 
or other voting practices or procedures that may 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the 
minority group; 
 
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether 
the members of the minority group have been denied 
access to that process; 
 
5. the extent to which members of the minority 
group in the state or political subdivision bear the 
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, 
employment and health, which hinder their ability to 
participate effectively in the political process; 
 
6. whether political campaigns have been 
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 
 
7. the extent to which members of the minority 
group have been elected to public office in the 
jurisdiction. 
 
Additional factors that in some cases have had 
probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence to 
establish a violation are: 
 
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness 
on the part of elected officials to the particularized 
needs of the members of the minority group. 
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whether the policy underlying the state or political 
subdivision's use of such voting qualification, 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or 
procedure is tenuous. 
 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07 (footnotes omitted). 
According to the Senate Report, there is no magical number 
of factors which must be shown to exist; "the question 
whether the political processes are `equally open' depends 
upon a searching practical evaluation of the `past and 
present reality.' " Id. at 207-08 (footnote omitted). 
Additionally, the Senate Report noted that "Section 2, as 
amended, adopts the functional view of `political process. 
. . .' " Id. at 208 n.120. See also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 
106 S.Ct. at 2763-64; Jenkins II, 4 F.3d at 1115. 
 
A plaintiff must establish three elements before he or she 
can demonstrate that minority voters have been deprived of 
the opportunity to elect representatives of their choosing in 
violation of Section 2. These factors, to which we alluded 
above, have come to be known as the "Gingles factors": 
 
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate 
that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact 
to constitute a majority in a single-member district. . . . 
Second, the minority group must be able to show that 
it is politically cohesive. . . . Third, the minority must 
be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it -- in the absence of 
special circumstances, such as the minority candidate 
running unopposed. . . usually to defeat the minority's 
preferred candidate. 
 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67 (footnotes 
and citations omitted). See also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. 
Bd., 117 S.Ct. 1491, 1498 (1997). 
 
The Supreme Court viewed the Gingles factors as 
"necessary preconditions," id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766, to 
finding a section 2 violation but also noted the importance 
of the other factors enumerated in the Senate Report. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals 
continuously have reiterated that the Gingles factors are 
necessary, but not sufficient, preconditions to a successful 
section 2 challenge. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 
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1011, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 2657 (1994); Jenkins II, 4 F.3d at 
1115; Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 980 (1st Cir. 
1995); N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 
1002, 1019 (2d Cir. 1995); Baird v. Consolidated City of 
Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1992). The two 
most important Senate Report factors are " `the extent to 
which minority group members have been elected to public 
office in the jurisdiction' and the `extent to which voting in 
the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially 
polarized.' " Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 
n.15 (citations omitted). 
 
The Supreme Court recently has refined the processes for 
evaluating Section 2 claims. "In a § 2 vote dilution suit, 
along with determining whether the Gingles preconditions 
are met and whether the totality of the circumstances 
supports a finding of liability, a court mustfind a 
reasonable alternative practice as a benchmark against 
which to measure the existing voting practice." Holder v. 
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2585 (1994) 
(footnote and citation omitted); see also Little Rock Sch. 
Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., #1, 56 F.3d 904, 
910 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 
We addressed Gingles in Jenkins II, where we emphasized 
that: 
 
The ultimate determination under § 2 remains whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, the 
multimember districting scheme at issue in this case 
deprived black voters of an equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. . . . Therefore, even 
after a court has determined that the plaintiffs proved 
each of the Gingles factors, it must go on to consider 
whether the totality of circumstances, evaluated under 
a searching practical evaluation of the past and 
present reality and a functional view of political 
process, establishes that the particular voting scheme 
diminishes the minority group's opportunity fully to 
participate in the political process. 
 
Jenkins II, 4 F.3d at 1115-16 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). We opined that it would be the 
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unusual case where the plaintiffs proved the Gingles factors 
yet could not prove a section 2 violation under the totality 
of the circumstances, but we did not foreclose the 
possibility that such a case could arise. Id. at 1116 n.6. See 
also Little Rock Sch. Dist. 56 F.3d 904 (court assumed 
existence of Gingles factors but found no violation 
established under totality of circumstances); Niagara Falls, 
65 F.3d 1002 (Gingles factors established, but no violation 
under totality of the circumstances). 
 
According to the district court, this case is such an 
unusual case. On remand, the district court addressed only 
the third Gingles factor, the existence and effect of white 
bloc voting, reasoning that we had affirmed its prior 
findings that the appellants had satisfied the other Gingles 
factors. Jenkins III, 1996 WL 172327, at *2. Using a three- 
step inquiry to analyze whether white bloc voting defeats 
minority preferred candidates in Red Clay, the district court 
"(1) identif[ied] which candidates were minority-preferred; 
(2) observe[d] whether the percentage of whites voting as a 
bloc against the minority-preferred candidate has been 
sufficient usually to defeat the minority-preferred 
candidate; and (3) decide[d] whether any of the elections 
involved special circumstances." Id. at *3 (footnote omitted). 
 
The district court found that five out of 11 minority- 
preferred candidates won their elections. Id. at *9. After 
considering whether the victories of minority-preferred 
candidates could be attributed to special circumstances, 
the district court concluded that "white voters usually vote 
as a bloc against the minority-preferred candidate when 
that candidate is black and there is a white candidate in 
the race. This bloc is large enough usually to defeat black 
minority-preferred candidates. In these circumstances, the 
court finds legally significant, although not overwhelming, 
white bloc voting." Id. at *18. 
 
Finding that appellants satisfied the three Gingles factors,2 
the district court then assessed the Senate Report factors. 
As we will discuss in more detail below, the district court 
addressed each factor individually, finding that some 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The appellees do not challenge this finding on appeal and, of course, 
the appellants accept it. 
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supported the appellants' claim while others weighed 
against finding a violation of Section 2. The court concluded 
that under the totality of the circumstances, the appellants 
failed to establish a section 2 violation. 
 
Appellants contend that this conclusion was in error and 
argue that the district court improperly weighed the various 
Senate Report factors in its analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances. The Board responds that the court's 
analysis was proper and also argues that the district 
court's conclusions are bolstered by the fact that the black 
voting population consistently has elected 10% black and 
20% minority-preferred candidates to the Board, afigure 
commensurate with the 13% black representation in the 
voting age population. 
 
During the initial appeal, we rejected the Board's 
argument that even if all the Gingles factors had been 
satisfied, the district court's analysis supported a finding 
that under the totality of the circumstances, no violation 
was established. First, we found that the district court's 
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances was tainted 
by its finding that the plurality-win rule combated the 
potential effects of white bloc voting. Jenkins II, 4 F.3d at 
1135. Second, we concluded that the district court's 
analysis was conclusory and did not comport with the 
requirement that the totality of the circumstances be 
subject to " `a searching practical evaluation.' " Id. (citation 
omitted). Third, even if a less searching evaluation were 
permitted, we required the district court to provide a more 
detailed explanation of its findings and analysis. Id. 
 
On remand, the district court corrected these errors. 
First, it discarded its plurality-win theory and reevaluated 
the elections to determine whether legally significant white 
bloc voting was established. Jenkins III, 1996 WL 172327, 
at *15. Thus, the plurality-win theory did not taint its 
findings on the remand. Second, the district court engaged 
in the more detailed evaluation contemplated by the Senate 
Report and the case law as we required in Jenkins II. 
Finally, the district court provided detailed explanations of 
its findings and analysis. 
 
As on the first appeal, the parties' dispute focuses on the 
findings related to white bloc voting. This time, however, 
 
                                11 
the disagreement centers not on the finding that the 
appellants established the third Gingles factor, but on how 
the district court's finding of legally significant white bloc 
voting influenced its other findings. Specifically, the parties 
dispute the weight to be accorded the electoral success of 
black candidates in the analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances. 
 
1. Significance of Proportional Representation and Minority 
Electoral Success 
 
In finding that appellants did not establish a Section 2 
violation, the district court relied in large part on the 
undeniably substantial success of minority candidates. 
Nevertheless, proportionality of representation, or the lack 
thereof, though relevant, is not dispositive either in proving 
or disproving a section 2 claim. See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. 
Dist., 56 F.3d at 911-912 (citing Johnson v. De Grandy); 
Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5, 71 F.3d 1382, 1388 (8th 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1876 (1996).3 
 
In Jenkins II, we rejected the Board's argument that the 
consistent proportional representation of blacks on the 
Board should defeat the section 2 claim. Jenkins II, 4 F.3d 
at 1131-32. We viewed the district court's findings that 
some of the black electoral victories were the product of 
special circumstances and its decision to consider the 
Gingles factors 
 
as a finding that the black voters of Red Clay had not 
achieved the persistent proportional representation 
discussed in Gingles that would defeat a § 2 claim at 
the threshold and thereby obviate the need to consider 
the Gingles factors. We conclude that the court's 
finding in this regard was not clearly erroneous as the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. These cases rely on Johnson v. De Grandy for support. However, the 
court in Johnson v. De Grandy was addressing a different sort of 
proportionality when it found that proportionality is relevant but not 
dispositive. As used there, the term "link[ed] the number of majority- 
minority voting districts to minority members' share of the relevant 
population. The concept is distinct from the subject of the proportional 
representation clause of 2. . . ." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1014 
n.11, 114 S.Ct. at 2658 n.11. 
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record amply supports a finding that the black voters 
of Red Clay have not achieved persistent proportional 
representation. 
 
Id. at 1132. 
 
On remand, the district court reassessed its earlier 
finding that black candidates had achieved substantial 
electoral success, but not sustained proportional 
representation, in light of its new findings that two white 
candidates who were elected to the Board also were 
minority-preferred. Jenkins III, 1996 WL 172327, at *24. 
The district court based its finding of substantial minority 
electoral success on several elections. First, the district 
court counted the 1981 victory of black candidate Harlan 
Roberts, who won a plurality of the votes in an election of 
seven candidates. The district court also found that black 
candidate Carolece Scotton's 1990 defeat of black candidate 
Rita Shockley demonstrated minority electoral success. Id. 
at *24. In 1991, black candidate Ronald Greene defeated 
white candidate Russell Fiske; the court also considered 
this election in its evaluation of minority electoral success. 
Id. 
 
The district court included in its evaluation the electoral 
victories of two white candidates, Charles Cavanaugh in 
1988 and Patricia Reinbold in 1989, whom it deemed 
minority-preferred. Appellants argue that although the 
district court did not allow these elections to defeat its 
finding of legally significant white bloc voting, it improperly 
weighed those elections in finding substantial minority 
electoral success. Appellants also claim that these 
candidates should not have been considered minority- 
preferred. 
 
In Jenkins II, we rejected a bright-line rule that any 
minority candidate should be viewed as minority-preferred 
and explained that although there is an inference that a 
minority candidate is minority-preferred, plaintiffs must 
provide evidence, such as statistical evidence regarding 
voting patterns or lay testimony, demonstrating that the 
candidate is, in fact, minority-preferred. Jenkins II, 4 F.3d 
at 1126. Similarly, we refused to propound a rule that only 
minority candidates may be considered minority-preferred. 
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Id. at 1126. Instead, we adopted a more flexible approach, 
emphasizing that courts must examine closely the nature of 
minority voter support for candidates, especially white 
candidates, to determine whether a particular candidate is 
minority-preferred. Id. at 1125-26 (citing Sanchez v. Bond, 
875 F.2d 1488, 1494-96 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
 
We enumerated several inquiries pertinent to determining 
whether a particular white candidate is minority-preferred. 
"One relevant consideration is the extent to which the 
minority community can be said to have sponsored the 
candidate." Jenkins II, 4 F.3d at 1129. An evaluation of that 
factor should focus on "the level of minority involvement in 
initially advancing the particular candidate and in 
conducting or financing that candidate's campaign." Id. The 
level of attention the candidate gave to minority needs and 
interests, including how often the candidate campaigned in 
predominantly minority areas, is also relevant. Id. at 1129. 
We also found pertinent the level of minority voter turn out 
in white-white elections, compared to the turn out when a 
black candidate is running. Id. "Finally, bearing in mind 
the disincentives that may exist for minority candidates to 
seek office, the extent to which minority candidates have 
run for office and the ease or difficulty with which a 
minority candidate can qualify to run for office may be 
relevant considerations." Id. We now examine individual 
elections. 
 
a. Election of Harlan Roberts in 1981 
 
The election of Harlan Roberts in 1981 has been a matter 
of some controversy during this litigation. Roberts is the 
only candidate ever elected to the Board by a plurality of 
the votes. The district court, considering the "practical 
effect" of the plurality-win rule in assessing minority 
electoral success, relied on this unusual election to support 
its finding of substantial black electoral success. Jenkins 
III, 1996 WL 172327, at *23. 
 
In Jenkins II, we accepted the district court's original 
finding that the Roberts victory occurred under special 
circumstances. Jenkins II, 4 F.3d at 1122-23, 1132. The 
district court's conclusion on remand that special 
circumstances were not at work in this election was based 
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on its finding that Roberts enjoyed substantial white and 
black support and its conviction that the victory should not 
be discounted simply because the plurality system 
contributed to Roberts' victory. Jenkins III, 1996 WL 
172327, at *15. This finding was clearly erroneous; this 
election involved the largest field of candidates ever to run 
for a single Board seat, id. at *14; it was the first Board 
election ever held, and Roberts was the only candidate ever 
to have won with a plurality of the vote, Jenkins II, 4 F.3d 
at 1122-23. 
 
However, this error does not require reversal and remand 
to the district court for yet another assessment of this case. 
Although the district court should have discounted the 
effect of this victory in its analysis of minority electoral 
success, the fact remains that a black candidate was 
elected. This election still should be counted, although it 
should be accorded less weight. Thus, although the district 
court erred in its analysis of this race, this error does not 
upset the overall evaluation of minority electoral success. 
Rather, we must look to the other races considered in the 
district court's analysis to determine whether the error is 
reversible. 
 
b. Carolece Scotton's Election in 1990 
 
The district court found that there were special 
circumstances in this election because it was between two 
black candidates. The court therefore found the election 
less probative on the question of white bloc voting. Jenkins 
III, 1996 WL 172327, at *17. Appellants urge that the 
district court erred by failing to consider this special 
circumstance in its analysis of black electoral success. 
 
Appellants' argument fails. In Jenkins II, we "express[ed] 
no opinion on the relationship between the consideration of 
special circumstances in the two contexts (sustained 
proportional representation and white bloc voting)." Jenkins 
II, 4 F.3d at 1119 n.9. Ironically, in its original opinion, the 
district court considered special circumstances in the 
context of its findings on sustained proportional 
representation but erroneously failed to apply those 
findings to its evaluation of white bloc voting. Id. We noted 
that Gingles requires the district court to consider those 
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circumstances in the context of white bloc voting, id., and, 
on remand, the district court did so. 
 
We now find that it is quite reasonable to hold that a 
particular election must be discounted for one purpose but 
not another. Here, the district court's finding that a black- 
black election should be discounted for purposes of 
evaluating white bloc voting does not compel the conclusion 
that the same election must be discounted when evaluating 
minority electoral success. To the contrary, the fact that 
two black candidates ran in one election, unopposed by any 
white candidate, is evidence of black electoral success. It 
demonstrates that blacks in Red Clay can and do put 
forward and support candidates who can succeed. The 
appellants actually seem to be asking us to discount any 
evidence of black electoral success; this we cannot do. 
There was no error in giving weight to the electoral success 
of Scotton in 1990.4 
 
c. Election of Ronald Greene in 1991 
 
Ronald Greene, a black candidate, defeated Russell Fiske, 
a white candidate, in a 1991 election for a special one-year 
term. The court found that both statistical and lay 
testimony demonstrated that Greene was the minority- 
preferred candidate. Jenkins III, 1996 WL 172327, at *9. 
This finding has not been challenged on appeal, and we 
accept it as not clearly erroneous. 
 
d. Election of Charles Cavanaugh in 1988 
 
In 1983, Cavanaugh, a white candidate, defeated Betty 
Anderson, who is black. The district court found that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In a footnote to their brief, appellants also argue that the court erred 
in finding that Scotton, rather than her opponent Shockley, was the 
minority-preferred candidate in 1990. Br. at 32 n.15. There is no 
detailed argument on this point, and we decline to address it. However, 
the evidence we have reviewed supports the district court's finding on 
this matter, and we view the argument as an effort by the appellants to 
persuade us (and the district court) to disregard all evidence of minority 
electoral success. For a more detailed discussion of this question, see 
Jenkins III, 1996 WL 172327, at *8 (comparing statistical evidence 
supporting Scotton's status as the minority-preferred candidate to 
plaintiffs' lay testimony about minority support for Shockley). 
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Anderson was the minority-preferred candidate in that race. 
In 1988, Cavanaugh, running unopposed, won reelection. 
Evaluating the factors delineated in Jenkins II, the district 
court concluded that by 1988 "Cavanaugh was the 
representative of choice of minority voters," and was the 
minority-preferred candidate. Id. at *7, 6. The district court 
found that Cavanaugh had become focused on the needs 
and interests of the minority community during his earlier 
term, and that in 1988 he was supportive of issues 
important to the minority community. Id. at *6. 
Additionally, the court found that there were no 
impediments to a minority candidate entering the 1988 
race against Cavanaugh. Id. at *7. 
 
This finding may be questionable, given that the district 
court recognized that no evidence demonstrated that the 
minority community advanced, conducted, or financed 
Cavanaugh's campaign in 1988. Id. at *6. Additionally, the 
court noted that there was no evidence that Cavanaugh's 
unopposed race affected black or white voter turnout. Id. 
Although the finding that Cavanaugh was minority- 
preferred may not be clearly erroneous, it is certainly not 
well supported. The district court should have discounted 
this race as having no impact on minority electoral success, 
just as it discounted this race in its assessment of white 
bloc voting, id. at *16. 
 
e. Election of Patricia Reinbold in 1989 
 
Reinbold, who is white, defeated white candidate Donald 
Schneck in 1989. Based on evidence that Reinbold 
campaigned on issues of concern to the minority 
community, blacks were involved in Reinbold's campaign 
efforts, important black community leaders supported 
Reinbold, and there were no barriers to a black candidate 
running in the election, the district court concluded that 
Reinbold was the minority-preferred candidate. Id. at *7-8. 
The court found that although black voter turn out 
decreased disproportionately in that year, the decrease 
could not be attributed to the absence of a black candidate. 
Id. at *7. 
 
The district court's conclusion that Reinbold was the 
minority-preferred candidate was not clearly erroneous. 
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Moreover, as noted above, individual elections can be 
accorded differing weight for different purposes. Although a 
white-white election obviously is of less relevance to an 
analysis of white bloc voting, it is relevant to an assessment 
of minority electoral success if white minority-preferred 
candidates defeat other white non-minority-preferred 
candidates. The district court did not err in considering this 
election in its assessment of minority electoral success. 
 
f. Conclusion on Minority Electoral Success 
 
Section 2 guarantees equality of opportunity for minority 
participation in the electoral and political processes. It does 
not focus on whether minorities are able to elect other 
minorities to office, but rather addresses whether minorities 
have an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their 
choice, whatever their race, to office. Although the district 
court did err in some respects, on the whole, discounting 
the elections which should have been weighed less heavily 
or ignored in the analysis of minority electoral success, we 
find that the district court did not commit clear error in 
concluding that minority electoral success, while not 
reaching sustained levels of proportionality, was 
substantial. Although several black candidates who sought 
election were defeated, often by white candidates, others 
were successful, and in some elections minorities also were 
able to elect white candidates of their choosing. The 
electoral success of Roberts, Scotton, Greene, and Reinbold 
support the finding of substantial minority electoral 
success. As the district court reasonably found, 
"Considering that black voters comprise only 13% of the 
VAP [voting age population], their success has been great. 
It has not been persistent or sustained, but it has been 
impressive." Id. at *24. These findings supported the 
district court's conclusion that under the totality of the 
circumstances, no section 2 violation was established. 
 
2. Analysis of the Remaining Senate Report Factors 
 
Appellants challenge the district court's findings on many 
of the Senate Report factors as erroneous and also argue 
that the court improperly weighed the different factors in its 
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Wefirst will 
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discuss the court's assessment of each factor and then 
evaluate the weight ascribed to each factor in its analysis of 
the totality of the circumstances. 
 
a. Past and Present Discrimination 
 
Finding a history of discrimination against minorities in 
Delaware and a general lower socioeconomic status of 
minorities in Red Clay, the district court concluded that 
those factors might have caused the demonstrated 
depressed minority political and electoral participation in 
Red Clay. Id. at *20. Appellants challenge only the weight 
accorded this finding in the totality of the circumstances 
analysis. 
 
b. Racial Polarization of Voting 
 
Based on its findings of voting cohesion among blacks as 
well as legally significant white bloc voting, the district 
court determined that voting in Red Clay is, to a degree, 
racially polarized. Id. at *21. This finding is not challenged 
on appeal. 
 
c. Effects of other Electoral Practices or Procedures 
 
On remand, the district court reaffirmed that the 
opportunity for electoral discrimination against minorities 
was not enhanced by other features of the Red Clay 
electoral system, such as the size of the district, the 
plurality-win rule, or the anti-single shot voting provision. 
Id. For example, although the anti-single shot rule 
precludes resort to a strategy that minorities could employ 
to elect candidates of their choosing, the court noted that 
it also ensures that citizens from each district in Red Clay 
have representatives on the Board. Id. These findings were 
not clearly erroneous. 
 
The district court also noted that other aspects of the Red 
Clay voting system were beneficial to minorities, 
particularly the absence of any voter registration 
requirements and the ability of voters to vote at any polling 
place in the district. Id. at *22. The court correctly 
concluded that these elements of the electoral system make 
it easier for minorities to vote. Similarly correct were the 
district court's original findings that the use of Tuesdays 
rather than Saturdays as election days did not enhance the 
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opportunity for discrimination. Jenkins I, 780 F. Supp. at 
236. 
 
The district court did not discuss in either opinion the 
appellants' charges that the opportunity for discrimination 
was enhanced by the low appointment rate of blacks as poll 
workers and election officials in school board elections. The 
parties stipulated that during a three-year period only ten 
of 149 such appointments were black. While this number 
obviously reflects some disparity, the appellants have not 
alerted us to any other record evidence on this issue, so it 
is not possible to determine whether the disparity is the 
result of intentional discrimination or how that disparity 
affects voter turnout. 
 
The appellants also claim that the district court erred 
"because of its failure to acknowledge that [the voting 
practices and procedures] include a nominating-district 
residency requirement that creates a direct barrier to 
minority candidacies outside the two Wilmington-based 
nominating districts." Br. at 48. This is a more serious 
concern; however, the district court adequately addressed 
this issue in its original opinion, concluding that the 
system promotes slating and also ensures that citizens 
from all areas of the district will be represented on the 
board. Jenkins I, 780 F. Supp. at 235. The court concluded 
that although the system precluded single shot voting 
which can help minorities elect candidates of their 
choosing, overall this feature of the electoral system did not 
work either in favor of or against minority voters. Id. at 
235-36. The district court again discussed this issue on 
remand, and reaffirmed its earlier findings. Jenkins III, 
1996 WL 172327, at *21. 
 
Appellants' contention that a nominating district 
requirement limits minority candidates to the two 
Wilmingon-based nominating districts strikes us as highly 
ironic. The appellants have brought this action seeking the 
establishment of a single-member district system with each 
district electing its own member. Thus, for example, only 
residents of District B could vote in the elections for the 
member from District B, and those residents could vote in 
only those elections. The theory, of course, is that a single- 
member district could become a majority-minority district, 
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thus leading to the election of a minority member. Yet, 
surely the appellants should recognize that according to 
their theory of this case, the system they seek would tend 
to limit minority candidates to the majority-minority district 
or districts. Although under the at-large system, black 
candidates most frequently run for election in Districts A 
and B, minority candidates have run for election from five 
different districts. Id. at *27. Thus, appellants now 
complain about a system that they seek to perpetuate and 
strengthen. 
 
On the whole, as the district court explained, the Red 
Clay election procedures "are open and accommodating and 
do not enhance the opportunity for discrimination against 
black citizens." Id. at *22. Thus, the district court's findings 
about the features of the Red Clay electoral system were 
not clearly erroneous. 
 
d. Accessibility of Slating Processes to Minority Candidates 
 
The district court reaffirmed its original conclusion that 
the slating processes are open to minority candidates. Id. 
This conclusion is not challenged on appeal. 
 
e. Use of Racial Appeals in Election Campaigns 
 
On remand, the district court reaffirmed its original 
conclusion that racial appeals were not used in Red Clay 
elections. Id. at *23. Appellants argue that the district court 
improperly discounted the use of a flyer during the 1988 
campaign that warned against voting for a black candidate 
who might support school population changes to promote 
racial balance. The district court correctly determined that 
this flyer did not constitute a racial appeal. Theflyer simply 
noted the three candidates' positions on changing feeder 
patterns within the School District, and it did not identify 
the candidates by race. Although the feeder pattern issue 
did involve the percentages of students of different races in 
the various schools and how the candidates might vote on 
feeder pattern issues, this flyer was more of an issue appeal 
than a racial appeal, albeit an issue heavily identified with 
racial concerns. The district court's finding on this factor 
was not clearly erroneous. 
 
f. Policies Supporting At-Large Multi-District System 
 
The district court reaffirmed its earlier finding that two 
policies support the use of at-large voting: it promotes 
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broader accountability of the Board members by requiring 
them to seek support from citizens of all district 
neighborhoods, and it allows citizens to vote every year for 
Board members, rather than once every five years, when a 
particular district seat comes up for election. Id. at *24-25. 
The district court found that the relationship between these 
policies and the use of the at-large electoral system was not 
tenuous. Moreover, all but one school district in Delaware 
elect board members in this manner. The common usage of 
this system further supports the district court's conclusion 
that the policies advanced in support of the at-large system 
are sufficiently related to the use of the system. The finding 
was not clearly erroneous. 
 
g. Responsiveness of the Board 
 
The district court reaffirmed its original finding that the 
Board had been unresponsive to minority concerns despite 
improvement in the areas of employment of black teachers 
and administrators and concerns about how black children 
were being placed into special education classes. Id. at *25. 
The court also noted, however, that a federal court now has 
held that the schools of Red Clay are desegregated, 
although there was substantial delay in achieving that 
result. Id. Also, some Board members, both black and 
white, have begun to represent and advocate for issues of 
concern to minorities. Id. Finally, the court noted that 
recent electoral victories of black and white minority- 
preferred candidates might represent or lead to increased 
responsiveness by the Board to minorities. Id. While the 
court found these factors significant, it still concluded that, 
on the whole, this Senate Report factor weighed in favor of 
appellants. This finding was not clearly erroneous. 
 
h. The Totality of the Circumstances 
 
In weighing the Senate Report factors in this case, the 
two most important factors, the existence of racially 
polarized voting and the extent of minority electoral 
success, tilted the balance in different directions. 
 
The district court found "legally significant, although not 
overwhelming, white bloc voting," in Red Clay. Id. at *18. 
The district court was entitled to accord substantial weight 
to the existence of white bloc voting in its analysis of the 
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totality of the circumstances; the fact that the white bloc 
voting was "not overwhelming" did not require the court to 
discount significantly this factor. However, the court was 
required to weigh this factor against its finding of 
substantial minority electoral success, and it did so, 
concluding that "[w]hile there has been legally significant 
racially polarized voting in Red Clay, the results of that one 
legal test do not tell the whole story." Id. at *28. In some 
cases, for example, either white bloc voting was not 
responsible for the defeat of a minority or minority- 
preferred candidate or there was actually cross-over white 
voting for such candidates. 
 
In the analysis of the totality of the circumstances, 
substantial minority electoral success strongly 
counterbalances the racially polarized voting. The 
significance of the level of minority electoral success 
achieved in Red Clay further is evidenced by the district 
court's comparison of the success achieved under the at- 
large system and the projected minority electoral success 
the appellants' proposed single-district system would 
produce. This comparison underscores the propriety of the 
district court's finding that no Section 2 violation was 
established by demonstrating that the proposed system 
would be unlikely to produce increased minority electoral 
success.5 
 
Relying on appellants' expert's testimony, the court found 
that a single district, District B, could be drawn in Red 
Clay, the voting age population of which would be 55.64% 
black. Id. at *27. This district would include sections of two 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that appellants argue that the district court's comparative 
analysis is flawed because the district court did not discount those 
elections in which special circumstances contributed to minority 
electoral success and therefore incorrectly overstated the electoral 
success in the at-large system. As noted above in the discussion 
regarding minority electoral success, however, the court's discounting of 
the elections was related to its assessment of white bloc voting, not 
minority electoral success. Although we found that some of those 
elections should have been discounted in the analysis of minority 
electoral success as well, we conclude that the district court's 
comparative analysis of the two electoral systems is not rendered clearly 
erroneous by its failure to discount these elections. 
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existing nominating districts, Districts A and B, and would 
enjoy, according to our calculations, an increase of almost 
44% in the percentage of minorities in the voting age 
population. In the new District A, blacks would comprise 
15.46% of the voting age population, id.; as we calculate it, 
this would represent almost a four percent increase. The 
district court concluded that if Red Clay adopted a single- 
member district system, blacks living in the new District B 
almost always would succeed in electing their chosen 
candidates, while blacks living outside of Districts A and B 
would not often succeed in electing their preferred 
candidates. Id. at *26. 
 
To date, a black candidate has won all of the elections in 
District B except for the 1985 election in which Harlan 
Roberts was defeated. Id. Reasoning that the results would 
be the same if District B were transformed into a majority 
black district in a single-member district system, the 
district court concluded that "[b]ecause under the single 
member district system the minority-preferred candidate 
can be expected usually to win in District B, Harlan 
Roberts' loss in 1985 logically could be blamed on the at- 
large system of election." Id. at *27. 
 
The district court concluded that a single-member system 
would benefit some minority candidates and voters while 
disadvantaging others: minority-preferred candidates 
running in District B would benefit from a change to a 
single-member district because of the significant increase of 
the percentage of blacks in the voting age population. Id. 
Candidates in District A also would benefit, but the portion 
of black voters for whose votes they would be competing 
would increase only slightly. Id. However, candidates 
running in other districts (C, D, E) would be disadvantaged, 
for the percentage of black voters to whom they could look 
for support would decrease from 12% to less than 3% in 
Districts E and D and 5% in District C. Id. The district 
court also concluded that by concentrating black voters 
into one district, the single-member plan also might 
concentrate black candidates into one district, thereby 
decreasing the representation of blacks outside that 
district. Id. Finally, the district court concluded that the 
single-member system might impair the ability of black 
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voters to elect white minority-preferred candidates by 
decreasing the incentives for white candidates in the non- 
black majority districts to appeal to black voters due to 
their decreased percentages in the voting age populations of 
those districts. Id. at *28. For these reasons, the district 
court found that "a switch to a single member district 
would have had and likely would have only a very minor 
impact, if any, on the success of minority-preferred 
candidates." Id.6 
 
Given the countervailing weight of the two most 
important Senate Report factors, the other Senate Report 
factors are very important in an assessment of the totality 
of the circumstances. The district court's findings make 
clear that, although there has been discrimination in Red 
Clay which may have resulted in the decreased minority 
voter participation, most of the features of the Red Clay 
electoral system not only have not increased discrimination 
against minorities but in several aspects actually have 
made the electoral system more accessible to minority 
voters and candidates. Moreover, racial appeals have not 
been used in Red Clay elections. Finally, the situation in 
Red Clay seems to be improving, as minority electoral 
success continues and the Board's responsiveness to 
minority concerns increases. Given these circumstances, we 
find that the district court properly weighed all the various 
Senate Report factors and reasonably concluded that no 
Section 2 violation was established. 
 
The district court conducted a searching analysis of past 
and present political realities in Red Clay, and it compared 
actual minority electoral success with the potential success 
a single-member system would produce. The district court 
followed our instructions on remand, and the evidence 
supported its conclusions. We, too, have made a searching 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that in the text of its opinion, the district court discussed the 
effects of the proposed single-member plan on onlyfive nominating 
districts. However, it is clear from the record, and from a footnote in the 
district court's opinion, that the proposed plan would maintain a system 
with seven nominating districts. App. at 846; Jenkins III, 1996 WL 
172327, at *30 n.35. The black voting age population would be 2.13% in 
proposed District F and 2.86% in proposed District G. Jenkins III, 1996 
WL 172327, at *30 n.35. 
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analysis of the numerous facets of this case, and based on 
that analysis, we are convinced that this case falls into that 
category of unusual cases where the Gingles factors are 
proved, but under the totality of the circumstances, no 
section 2 violation is established. Although racially 
polarized voting has characterized Red Clay elections, there 
has been substantial minority electoral success, and a 
change to a single-member system would not improve 
appreciably the level of such success. Therefore, the district 





The district court's factual findings (except where noted 
with regard to certain electoral results) and conclusions 
were not clearly erroneous. We therefore uphold the district 
court's conclusion that no section 2 violation was 
established. Consequently, we affirm the order of April 12, 
1996, entering judgment in favor of the appellees. 
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
When last this case was before our court, Jenkins v. Red 
Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 
1993) [Jenkins I], we stated that"it would be a highly 
unusual case in which a plaintiff successfully proved the 
existence of the three Gingles factors and still failed to 
establish a violation [of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act]." Id. at 
1116 n.6; see also id. at 1135. Since that time, several 
other Courts of Appeals have adopted our view.1 Yet today 
the majority retreats from the compelling mandate of 
Jenkins I, finding a "highly unusual" situation in the 
ordinary and ambiguous details of the case as currently 
presented. For this reason, I respectfully dissent. 
 
The majority correctly states that the Gingles factors are 
merely preconditions to a successful § 2 challenge, and that 
courts must look beyond these factors to the totality of the 
circumstances. The majority is also correct in stating that 
the totality of the circumstances analysis focuses on the 
Senate Report factors, and that the two most important 
factors are "the extent to which voting in the elections of 
the state or political subdivision is racially polarized" and 
"the extent to which members of the minority group have 
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction." But the 
majority's analysis hinges on its view that minority 
candidates have enjoyed "undeniably substantial success" 
in Red Clay elections. I see the elections through a different 
lens. The majority's weighing of the Senate Report factors is 
imbalanced, and its affirmance of the district court decision 
is unwarranted. 
 
In focusing on the details of this case, the majority has 
apparently overlooked the broad sweep of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and its 1982 amendments. 
The Act is widely considered to be the most successful piece 
of civil rights legislation ever enacted by Congress. See, e.g., 
Alexander Athan Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1396 (5th Cir. 
1996); Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995); NAACP 
v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1020 n.21 (2d Cir. 1995); Nipper 
v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1514 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
1795 (1995). 
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With the Voting Rights Act, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1810, 1835 
(1992). President Lyndon Johnson recognized the critical 
importance of the vote to minorities when he responded to 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by stating, "Yes, yes, . . . I want 
all of those other things -- buses, restaurants, all of that -- 
but the right to vote with no ifs, ands, or buts, that's the 
key." Merle Miller, Lyndon, An Oral Biography 371 (1980). 
 
The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act 
acknowledged that while outright deprivation of the right to 
vote was more or less a thing of the past, minority vote 
dilution was still a tenacious problem. See, e.g., Armand 
Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, in Minority Vote Dilution 145, 145 
(Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). When it enacted the 
amendments, Congress was aware that at-large elections 
were seen as the principal impediment to minority 
representation. See, e.g., Timothy G. O'Rourke, The 1982 
Amendments and the Voting Rights Paradox, in 
Controversies in Minority Voting 85, 110 (Bernard Grofman 
& Chandler Davidson eds., 1992). 
 
The purpose of Section 2 is to prohibit electoral 
arrangements which "dilute" (i.e., diminish) the voting 
power of racial minority groups. For example, at-large 
electoral systems (which allow every voter to vote for as 
many candidates as there are legislative seats to be 
filled in an entire jurisdiction) often violate Section 2 by 
allowing a cohesive racial majority to elect every single 
legislator, thereby leaving racial minorities 
unrepresented. 
 
Michael E. Lewyn, When Is Cumulative Voting Preferable to 
Single-Member Districting?, 25 N.M. L. Rev. 197, 197 (1995) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 
It is against the broad mandate from Congress, that we 
eliminate minority vote dilution resulting from at-large 
electoral systems, that we must evaluate the case now 
before us. Plaintiffs had asked the district court to order 
Red Clay to adopt a system of single-member districts, the 
traditional remedy in cases of this sort, see, e.g., Lewyn, 
supra, at 197, and one which would virtually guarantee 
that minorities are represented on the Red Bank school 
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board. The majority has instead, by affirming the district 
court decision, placed its imprimatur on a system which 
only by a series of flukes and anomalies has permitted any 
minority representation at all. This cannot be the desire of 
Congress, and it most certainly is not that of the Supreme 
Court. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 76 (1986) 
("Where multimember districting generally works to dilute 
the minority vote, it cannot be defended on the ground that 
it sporadically and serendipitously benefits minority 
voters."). 
 
When we examine the "undeniably substantial success of 
minority candidates" upon which the majority relies, we see 
that it is neither undeniable nor substantial. The majority 
itself acknowledges that Harlan Roberts' 1981 plurality 
victory was a never-repeated situation which should be 
discounted. This echoes our view in Jenkins I in 1993: 
 
Since no candidate, black or white, has won with a 
mere plurality since 1981, and only one black 
candidate has run in an election against more than a 
single opposing candidate since 1981, the court could 
not have concluded on this record that the plurality 
scheme had the actual effect of allowing the black 
voters of Red Clay to elect their representatives of 
choice even though the white voters consistently voted 
against the minority-preferred candidates in numbers 
sufficient to prevent those candidates from winning a 
majority of the overall vote. 
 
Jenkins I, 4 F.3d at 1123. 
 
Carolece Scotton, who was slated with a white, suburban 
candidate, beat another black candidate in an election in 
which no white candidate chose to run. The election took 
place in 1990, the year after this lawsuit was filed. The 
Supreme Court has noted that it might be proper for lower 
courts to view with some caution the success of black 
candidates during the pendency of litigation. Gingles, 478 
U.S. at 76. See also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 
1307 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[S]uch success might be attributable 
to political support motivated by different considerations -- 
namely that election of a black candidate will thwart 
successful challenges to electoral schemes on dilution 
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grounds."); Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 367 
n.27 (E.D.N.C. 1984) ("[I]n some elections the pendency of 
this very litigation worked a one-time advantage for black 
candidates in the form of unusual organized support by 
white leaders concerned to forestall single-member 
districting . . .."). 
 
Ronald Greene won against a white candidate in a mid- 
term election with exceptionally low voter turnout. Greene 
was perceived as being aligned with white suburban 
interests, presumably because of his strong opposition to 
mandatory school reassignment. On the morning of the 
election, a flyer was distributed stating that the white 
candidate, Fiske, had withdrawn from the race. Fiske 
testified that this had a major impact on the election 
because the timing made it impossible for him to respond 
that the statement was untrue. 
 
We see that of ten black candidates to run in Red Clay in 
the years 1981 to 1991, only three succeeded: one (Roberts) 
in a never-repeated plurality win, one (Scotton) by defeating 
another black candidate, and one (Greene) in a little- 
noticed mid-term election. This hardly exemplifies 
substantial or consistent electoral success. On the 
contrary, it demonstrates legally significant white bloc 
voting. The dismal picture is not improved by adding into 
the mix the two white candidates characterized by the 
district court as "minority-preferred," and upon which it 
relied so much in reaching its ultimate result. The majority 
acknowledges that Charles Cavanaugh was, in fact, not 
minority-preferred, and the district court "should have 
discounted this race as having no impact on minority 
electoral success." Maj. op. at 17. As to the other white 
candidate, Patricia Reinbold, of the two blacks identified by 
her as important in her campaign, only one testified before 
the district court. He had this to say in response to a query 
as to why he supported Reinbold: "I guess I couldn't stand 
Schneck, who was running against her." This is not the 
sort of "minority sponsorship" we envisioned when, in 
Jenkins I, we gave explicit instructions for determining 
whether a white candidate is "truly the minority 
community's representative of choice." Jenkins I at 1126. 
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Our decision today guarantees that minority voting rights 
in Red Clay will continue to depend upon happenstance. 
This is not what Lyndon Johnson envisioned when he 
instructed his attorney general to write the "toughest voting 
rights act that you can devise." Howell Raines, My Soul Is 
Rested 337 (1977). It is not what Congress envisioned when 
it gave the president that law, and then made it even more 
effective with the 1982 amendments. And it is not what this 
court envisioned when in Jenkins I we emphasized 
repeatedly the rarity of a case where "an electoral system 
that routinely results in white voters voting as a bloc to 
defeat the candidate of choice of a politically cohesive 
minority group is not violative of § 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act." Jenkins I at 1135. 
 
I believe that the plaintiffs' proof of the three crucial 
Gingles factors and other elements that show impeded 
access by black citizens to full participation in the Red Clay 
School District more than meet the tests necessary to 
establish a violation of Section 2 under the totality of the 
circumstances. In light of the prolonged history of this case 
and its remand in 1993, remand for further findings would 
only aggravate an obviously unsatisfactory situation. 
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's judgment 
for the defendants and remand the case to it to fashion 
forthwith an appropriate remedy. 
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